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HOW DoD MEASURES THE BALANCE OF POWER

By Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense



Cooperation and Competition are Important factors for the

BALANCE OF POWER

By Dr. Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense

In considering the overall balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, we must include many elements—the economic, the political, the technological, the ideological, and the degree of domestic cohesion, among others. In these overall terms, there is no doubt in my mind that the United States is the most powerful country in the world. But I want to cover our military situation and our military course. I would like to explain why I agree there are certain grounds for concern; but also—if we respond in a measured way—for reasonable confidence. For the foreseeable future, as President Carter has said, the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to cooperate —and to compete. The precise mixture of the two will depend on the place, the issue, very much on Soviet behavior, and also on how we see our own national interests in each case.

We have no illusions about the Soviet Union. Their view of history, of the world, and of the future is very different from our own. We do not believe we should ever rely on good will as a substitute for good defense. The Soviets appear willing to strike

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DEFENSE news briefs

Exercise Unitas XIX Gets Underway

For the 19th consecutive year, ships and aircraft of Latin American nations have joined with the U.S. Navy in a series of exercise, in South American waters.

Called UNITAS XIX, the maritime exercise involves Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, and the United States.

RAdm. John J. Ekelund, of the U.S. Navy, Commander of the South Atlantic Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, is in command of the operation which began in late July and ends in early December.

The U.S. Task Force (USS William V. Pratt, USS Bowen, USS Dupont, USS Scamp, Patrol Squadron Eleven, plus other naval aviation elements) will make some 20 port calls in eight different countries in the total 4½ month deployment.

Marines Again Win Environmental Award

The Marine Corps Base at Camp Pendleton, Calif., has won the 1977 Secretary of Defense Environmental Quality Award.

This is the second consecutive year that the Marines have won the award.

Pendleton was cited for an integrated program of pollution abatement, land utilization, wildlife management, soil conservation, water management, and archaeological and historical preservation.

New War Delcared Against Drug Abuse

A new campaign against drug abuse in the Armed Force has been launched by the Department of Defense.

While drug abuse in the military is not of epidemic proportions, it is a serious matter, Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan Jr., told the House of Representatives Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control.

"There is no subject that commands a higher priority for us than the health and readiness of our military personnel," Mr. Duncan stressed.

He said DoD's concerns are threefold:

The magnitude of the problem; the effects of the problem on military readiness; and the quality of our efforts to deal with it.

Army Keeping WWII Rifles

Army has decided to retain some 760,000 surplus M-1 rifles and 204,000 surplus M-1 carbines in its inventory for contingencies.

Originally, Army had considered destroying about 500,000 of these World War II weapons.

Army Secretary Clifford L. Alexander Jr., further directed the Army to retain obsolete Browning automatic rifles and M-2 carbines for contingency purposes and potential foreign military sales.

The order does not affect the annual sale of some 600 M-1 rifles to qualified individuals but it does withdraw the offer of carbines for sale.

Air Force Imposes Dragonfly Restrictions

Air Force has imposed precautionary restrictions on A-37 Dragonfly fighters assigned to four Air Reserve and two Air National Guard units because of elevator buffeting at high speed.

Air Training Command T-37s are not affected by the elevator problem or by the operating restrictions.

Pentagon Policy Post Goes to Stanley Resor

The President has nominated Stanley R. Resor to be the new Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Currently, the American representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks at Vienna, Austria, Mr. Resor also served as Secretary of the Army from 1965 to 1971.

In his new post as one of the two "third men" at the Pentagon, the new Under Secretary will report directly to the Secretary of Defense for all matters concerned with political-military affairs, arms limitation negotiations, and the integration of departmental plans and policies with overall national security objectives.

JCS Corridor Latest in Pentagon

Another commemorative corridor—the Joint Chiefs of Staff Corridor—was dedicated recently at the Pentagon by the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Gen. David C. Jones.

The corridor, between the River and Mall entrances on the second floor, contains historical pictures and other graphic displays telling the story of the JCS organization.

The Pentagon has many other special corridors. Just to name a few—Eisenhower, Bradley, Marshall, Arnold, Nimitz, Secretaries of Defense, Presidents of the United States.

These corridors and other displays of military art and lore make the Pentagon one of the tourist attractions of the Nation's capital.

some bargains—as we hope for in the Strategic Arms Limitation talks (SALT)—that can reduce the chances of mutual destruction. At the same time, because our interests and objectives do diverge in important respects, there have been and will be times and places where U.S. and Soviet policies will conflict and tensions will arise.

This is regrettable, and it is not the way we would like the relationship to proceed. But it is a fact of modern life. And it is not all that different from the international relations of the past. Countries, like other political entities, do compete. Unfortunately, they rarely compete by the rules that govern domestic, democratic politics. There is nothing particularly new in that regard either.

Something New

Something else is new, however. It is the changed situation of the United States. An impressive number of things have happened to us during the past 40 years. For a long time we have been the mainstay of the great industrial democracies; for the past 35 years, we have been their leader. At the same time, we have grown vulnerable to nuclear attack, and dependent on others for our economic well being. We also have found ourselves the custodians of great military power.

Most Americans would prefer to use U.S. resources for other than military purposes. But as long as the world stays the way it is, and competition remains at least as important as cooperation on the international scene, U.S. military strength—like the postwar U.S. role and responsibility—will have to remain another fact of modern life. The more assured our military capability, the less we need risk dangerous actions to show our resolve. The weaker we are, the more likely we are to compensate (or think we have to compensate) by risky behavior. Our power must be fully adequate at all times to its tasks. If it is truly so, perceptions will, in the long run, catch up with the facts.

Whether the military balance of power has tilted toward the Soviet Union is bound to be an important and difficult issue in these circumstances. The issue is important on two counts:

- First, because of the outward pressures exerted by the Soviets—for a long time against nations that border on the Soviet Bloc, but more recently against nations farther away.
- Second, because of the resources invested in their military establishment by the Soviets during the past 15 years—a steady three to four percent increase in Soviet military spending each year for that period.

Soviet military capability has improved substantially over the past decade. But the Soviet Union is **not** stronger militarily than the United States. When talking about something as general as the military balance of power, we run into problems of measurement. There are many simple and popular ways to compare our military capabilities with those of the Soviet Union. The subjects for these kinds of comparisons are almost endless. Personnel, tanks, aircraft, ships, submarines, missiles, warheads and megatons can all be counted up and compared. Depending on which items are selected for comparison, the results can be made to favor the side of one's choice. It is rare that all the possible indicators point in a single direction.

Different Objectives

That is not surprising. The United States and the Soviet Union have quite different political and military objectives. The impact of geography on their needs and goals is bound to be quite asymmetrical. The defense programs of the two countries are affected by differing

Vessels of the standing naval force of NATO cruise in formation. From foreground: Canadian Destroyer Escort Skeena; Netherlands Navy Frigate Evertsen; West German Fast Frigate Braunschweig; British General Purpose Frigate HMN Aurora; and the Guided Missile Destroyer USS Charles F. Adams.

Air National Guard A-7 aircraft train with a Dutch F-5 during a Guard unit's two-week deployment to Gilze-Rijen Air Base, Netherlands to participate in joint U.S./Dutch exercises.

experiences, traditions, and technologies. Their respective allies differ greatly in wealth, motivation, and loyalty.

For all these reasons, the simple comparisons you hear so much about can rarely illuminate more than the idiosyncracies of their authors. They tell us little about our ability to defend Western Europe, or how to keep open essential sea lanes to Japan. And they certainly do not help us in the planning and programming of our defenses. We could, of course, go out and simply try to duplicate Soviet capabilities—but it would not make sense to do so. Our interests are different. We do not need four million men, 45,000 tanks, or 10,000 surface-to-air missile launchers. We need whatever it takes to protect our interests.

Basically, we want to forestall or deter conflicts that could jeopardize those interests. To deter, we must be able, ready, and willing to fight—and fight to as successful a conclusion as the facts of modern arms allow. Deterrence cannot be a bluff; it must be credible.

But how can we judge the adequacy of our capabilities for this purpose? The conventional way is by trying to measure the performance of those capabilities in a series of hypothetical combat encounters. We don't necessarily care whether the Soviets have more tanks than we do. We do care whether, in the event of a Soviet attack, we are able to throw it back. We assume—and I think with some merit—that if we can produce that kind of a result, we will have produced a powerful deterrent to attack. And that, I think—rather than simply out-distancing the Soviets in numbers of tanks or any other single item—is what should be demanded of the United States and allied defense establishments.

Perhaps I have made the whole process of planning and assessment sound simple. It is not. In order to make the necessary judgments about our capabilities, we have to take a variety of factors into account. In the present and foreseeable state of affairs, one of those factors has to be the total military capabilities of the Soviet Union.

However, while it is critical, that factor cannot be considered in isolation. The decisive variables would be:

- What the Soviets and their satellites could actually invest in a particular campaign;
- Where and how the attack might take place, and

• What our allies could contribute toward stopping it.

How many attacks, or contingencies, might occur in a short space of time, and how many we should try to cope with more or less simultaneously, would also be major factors in determining our defense needs and their adequacy.

Large Possibilities

The universe of possibilities is obviously very large. The United States has developed a wide range of interests. They are reflected in, but not totally defined by, our formal treaty commitments. Those interests are located around the world. There is a small probability that a number of attacks could be launched simultaneously on our interests, but the military capabilities of the Soviets and their allies are far from unlimited. The Soviets cannot be powerful everywhere at once, any more than we can. Nonetheless, we need to have a basic strategic concept which defines the magnitude—and the location—of the effort that at all times we should be prepared, to make. Otherwise, we could find ourselves planning to try to defend in all places at once.

The present administration has spent a good deal of time considering what the strategic concept should be. Here, I will only outline the objectives and policies we have established. It must be remembered, though, that these objectives and policies are not predictions, forecasts, or ironclad commitments. They constitute guidance designed to make our defense planning problem tractable, to ensure careful conservatism in our planning, and at the same time to keep from trying to attain defense capabilities which would far exceed those realistically necessary.

It is a truism of modern defense policy that we must maintain the military capabilities for three basic types of warfare and their deterrence:

- strategic nuclear;
- tactical nuclear, and
- non-nuclear.

Much less obvious is the degree of dependence to place on each of the above. This administration—like its four predecessors—has decided that while it cannot and will not neglect our nuclear forces, we must keep the barriers to nuclear warfare—our non-nuclear capabilities—as high as our resources permit.

Nuclear Response

The Soviets and their allies, if considering an attack on us, our forces, or our allies, must also consider the possibility of a nuclear response. However, we reject nuclear escalation as the sole policy on which to base the planning of our forces or the use of those forces. We plan to avoid relying on nuclear weapons unless their use is clearly in the interest of the United States and our allies or is forced on us by the nuclear actions of others.

We and our allies must have adequate conventional forces. That should be understood by everyone, and it should be understood as our continuing policy.

In our approach to the strategic nuclear forces, we continue to hope that we can limit the Soviet-American competition in these deadly capabilities through SALT. Indeed, we are pursuing that goal with undiminished vigor, but our basic objectives of strategic deterrence, adequate stability, and equivalence are overriding. We will insist on their maintenance with or without a SALT agreements. We will not sacrifice them for the sake of agreement.

What we need for the purposes of deterrence, stability, and equivalence is not dictated by any simple comparison with the forces of the Soviet Union. Our needs are met if our retaliatory forces can satisfy the following conditions:

- Survive in adequate numbers after a well-executed surprise attack on them by the Soviets;
- Penetrate Soviet defenses and destroy a wide range of targets in the Soviet Union with whatever degree of deliberation and control proves desirable;
- Inflict high levels of damage on Soviet society regardless of the measures the Soviets might take to limit such damage, and
- Retain thereafter an offensive capability roughly equivalent in performance to that of the Soviet Union.

Second-strike capabilities that can satisfy these conditions would, in my view, provide strategic deterrence, stability, and equivalence; these are the proper conditions to meet rather than the ones implied by the simple, static comparisons that inevitably will also be used by some.

If we continue to take the necessary precautions—and particularly if aided by a successful outcome to SALT—strategic nuclear warfare should be the least probable conflict of the future. Regional conflicts involving non-nuclear capabilities will continue to be much more likely.

The risk of nuclear warfare will become significant only to the degree that we fail to maintain the non-nuclear forces necessary to defend and protect our interest. The degree to which we maintain adequate nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, will determine what Soviet threats to our interests are likely to be channeled into political and economic actions, subversion, and military support to Soviet allies—including those that

somehow manage to label themselves as non-aligned—in the developing world.

Analysis tells us that the outcome of traditional non-nuclear conflict appears to be determined by the ratio of forces between the opponents. If the attacker, for example, has a three-to-one advantage over the defender in capability across a front, the odds strongly favor him. Consequently, it is even more tempting here than in the nuclear realm to compare U.S. and Soviet capabilities in a side-by-side fashion.

It is no secret that a quarter of the Soviet non-nuclear capability is on the Chinese frontier; that many aspects of the Soviet logistic capability remain fragile; that current Soviet operating doctrines require larger forces than we would use for the same purpose; and that we have stronger, more reliable allies than the Soviets. The simplistic comparisons ignore all this. As a result, unless adequately explained, they can leave the impression of enormously preponderent Soviet forces about to spill over into western territory. A conventional defense, in such an oversimplified scenario, would seem quixotic. But the real situation, as I said, is more complex.

We and our European allies have about 10 percent fewer people under arms than the Soviet Bloc. But we do not need to match the Soviets in everything at once. Our job is to protect our interests, not to try to defeat all Soviet forces wherever they may be.

Growing Threat

In particular, a major two-front attack on our interests has become increasingly implausible with the continuation of the Sino-Soviet split and the improvement in our relations with China. What must therefore concern us first and foremost is the heavy concentration of Soviet general purpose forces in Eastern Europe and in the western districts of the Soviet Union. Those forces represent a continuing and growing threat to the security of Western Europe, both on the central front and on the flanks. They also define the magnitude of the largest contingency we are likely to face in the foreseeable future.

Putting stress on Europe is not to rule out a major contingency elsewhere, or the possibility of a smaller attack by Soviet or other forces in such sensitive areas as the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or Korea. However, for planning purposes, it seems appropriate to base the size of our ground, naval, and tactical air forces on the assumption of having simultaneously to stop one major attack (with Europe as the most obvious candidate) and a smaller attack elsewhere.

I should stress that such an approach—or strategic concept—is not quite as demanding as it sounds. Wherever appropriate, we plan our general purpose forces on the assumption that they will be supplementing allied forces rather than going it alone.

Moreover, we rely on much more than our active duty forces. Should any of these possible conflicts be of significant duration, we would depend on our Guard and Reserve units, and on our mobilization base (including the draft), to expand and reinforce our initial combat capabilities. We do not assume that our more costly (and more ready) active duty forces would have the burden, or need the resources, to fight to the end of these hypothetical conflicts all by themselves.

Our need for general purpose forces obviously is dictated by much more than this strategic concept. We will have satisfied that need only if we have provided for ourselves such other military capabilities as:

- The retention of a powerful central reserve in the United States, as well as forces deployed in key overseas areas such as Europe and Northeast Asia;
- The ability to move substantial forces to threatened theaters with great speed;
- The maintenance of forward defenses for at least as long as any enemy could sustain his attack;
- The support of these defenses with reinforcements and sustaining supplies, and
- Uninterrupted access by air and sea to the theaters of conflict.

In other words, our forces must be fully equipped, modern, combat-ready and highly mobile as well as adequate in numbers. These are essential qualitative conditions to success, which must not be overlooked in force comparisons.

It should be obvious that, if our strategic nuclear and general purpose forces can satisfy the conditions I have outlined, they would be equal or superior to an enemy's capabilities—at least where and how it counts.

But, are we in fact able to satisfy all these conditions?

Is our deterrent strong enough?

If, somehow, events should culminate in a failure to deter war, could we reach our objectives?

Surely, these are the questions we should be asking, not whether the Soviet navy has more coastal patrol boats than we do, or whether the U.S. Navy weighs more than that of the Soviets.

Number of Tests

We have developed a number of tests as the basis for answering these questions. The first of them is to analyze an exchange

following a Soviet surprise attack on our strategic nuclear forces. Admittedly, it is a hypothetical case and only an approximation of potential reality. But by being severe, it provides a conservative test.

The test results show that such an attack would have no prospect of disarming the United States—any more than we could disarm the Soviets if we struck first. At some point in the foreseeable future, it is conceivable that the Soviets could by a first strike eliminate the bulk of our intercontinental ballistic missile silos. On the other hand, the Soviets would have to consider the possibility that our MINUTEMAN missiles would no longer be in their silos when their ICBMs arrived. We have not adopted a doctrine of launch under attack but they surely would have to take such a possibility into consideration. In any event, our surviving second-strike capability would be very large—and it is scheduled to grow. Not only could we cover a wide range of targets with our retaliation; we could also cause catastrophic damage to the Soviet urban-industrial base. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how the Soviets could expect to gain any meaningful advantage from starting such a mortal exchange.

With respect to our general purpose forces, the most

dateline: R&D

A research assistant inspects the thermal receiver unit of a Thermal Imaging System for the U.S. Army's new XM-1 main battle tank.

New LAAT Sight

Hughes Aircraft Company's electro-optical and data systems group, Culver City, Calif., is working on the first feasibility model of a Laser Augmented Airborne TOW (LAAT) sight. The new sight is equipped with a mini laser rangefinder which will allow crews of the U.S. Army's AH-1S Cobra gun ships to direct cannon and rocket fire with deadly accuracy and launch TOW anti-tank missiles from maximum stand-off ranges. The improved sight is part of a major upgrade of the Cobra helicopters by prime contractor Bell Helicopter Textron that will include an improved fire control system and a 20mm cannon. The laser range data will be used by the helicopter's new digital fire control computer. In addition to the LAAT feasibility model, Hughes will build two production prototypes, with a production decision anticipated in November of 1978.

New RPV Tests

Lockheed Co. is working on a new remotely controlled airplane that looks like a baby U-2.

Actually, the remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) is based on a sailplane—the Caproni A21J, a two-placed fiberglass, 67 foot-long plane that also is motorized with a jet engine.

MULE Laser Device

A new laser device that will enable the U.S. Marine Corps' forward observers to spot targets accurately for conventional artillery and to direct sophisticated laser-guided weapons with deadly precision has entered full-scale engineering development. The man-portable, tripod-mounted Modular Universal Laser Equipment (MULE) is compatible with all laser-guided weapons now operational or under development, including laser Maverick and cannon-launched laser-guided projectiles will be constructed. Six engineering development models of MULE under a contract being managed for the Marine Corps by the U.S. Army Missile Research and Development Command, Redstone Arsenal, Ala.

National Guard M-60-A1 tank crews are ready to be moved out while another tank crew (inset) puts a track on their M-60-A1.

demanding test would come from an attack by the Warsaw Pact in Europe. In principle, such an attack could begin as a bolt out of the blue. But the more serious likelihood is that it would be preceded by a period of international tension, some degree of preparation by the Pact, and at least a few days of warning. Obviously, the more preparation and warning, the larger and better organized the attack could be. But NATO, during that warning period, would benefit as well, especially from U.S. reinforcements.

You may have heard it said that in any major European conflict, the Warsaw Pact could simply overrun NATO's defenses. That impression is wrong. NATO already has bought and paid for the basic capabilities necessary for the conduct of a successful forward defense. It is also true, however, that the Pact has somewhat expanded and substantially improved its forces in Eastern Europe during the past decade. NATO, for its part, always has had a number of vulnerabilities; and some have now grown more severe. The Soviets today still cannot be confident of a conventional victory in Europe. But the Alliance, despite its basic strengths, does not have as much assurance in its non-nuclear deterrent as I think prudent.

The recent NATO Summit in Washington defined what needs to be done to increase that assurance. It also endorsed a three percent annual growth in the defense budgets of the NATO countries and an ambitious Long-Term Defense Program for the Alliance. We strongly support both decisions, just as we do the resumption of military assistance to Turkey, which was also a major matter for discussion at the Summit. This is no more the time to rebuff one of our staunchest allies than it is to ignore NATO's long-standing vulnerabilities.

Let me note also that there is no truth in exaggerated allegations of a decline in our Navy. Our Navy is and will remain second to none. U.S. naval forces are still quite capable of maintaining the sea lines of communication to Europe, protecting other essential routes, and supporting allies—whether in the Western Pacific or on the NATO flanks. Moreover, these forces will gain in strength during the years ahead. We still have a number of difficult issues to resolve about the exact future direction of the Navy. But none of those issues brings into question the importance of the Navy, or the desirability of its performing its traditional missions within the guidelines of national strategy.

I could go on—about airlift and sealift, war reserve stocks, combat-readiness, and long-term investments. But I have said enough, I trust, to dispel a little of the alarm—but not, I hope, the concern. Complacency is not a condition we can afford. The Soviets are too serious and determined about military issues and military spending for us to be anything but serious and determined in reply. We must be concerned; we must act prudently; but we should refuse to be panicked. The power, determination, and stability of the United States as a competitor, and the degree of cohesion exhibited by U.S. alliances, will strongly influence Soviet behavior.

If we manage our resources properly, we do not need to outspend the Soviets by a large margin in order to assure our security. We can outthink, outdesign, and outperform the Soviets with the resources we have and the steady increases we are requesting. I have consistently been of the opinion that careful, systematic, and thoughtful analysis—unencumbered by ideological baggage—along with technical proficiency and efficiency in management, are where our strengths lie.

To keep our position in the long-run competition, these approaches must characterize our style. A dash less of alarm, more than just the flavor of anaysis, a strong infusion of technology, and double shot of efficiency are what we need.

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(COVER) Air Force C-141 on ramp at Gilze-Rijen, Netherlands.

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CHANGE OF COMMAND

Maj. Gale H. French, left, receives Kolligion trophy from Gen. Lew Allen Jr., Air Force Chief of Staff.

Honors

Maj. Gale H. French, of the Air Force Reserve, won the Koren Kolligian Jr. Trophy, an annual award to the aircrew member who most successfully coped with an extraordinary in-flight emergency. This year marks the first year a Reservist has received the award.

2nd Lt. William H. Ibbetson, now stationed in Germany won the Hughes Trophy as the outstanding ARMY ROTC graduate of 1977. A graduate of Texas A&M, the lieutenant was selected from more than 5,000 Army ROTC graduates for academic and leadership accomplishments.

Appointments

Michael H. Armacost has been appointed as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA) for East Asia Pacific and Inter-American Affairs.

Reassignments

VAdm Samuel L. Gravely Jr., U.S. Third Fleet commander, was named Director, Defense Communications Agency effective Aug. 1, 1978.

Lt. Gen. DeWitt C. Smith, U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, has been named Commandant, U.S. Army War College. He will be recalled to active duty as a major general following his retirement in August in his current lieutenant general position.

RAdm David F. Emerson, Operational Test and Evaluation Force commander, will be Director of Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. He also has been nominated for promotion to vice admiral.

Maj. Gen. Howard M. Lane, commander of the Armament Development and Test Center, Eglin AFB, Fla. has been named Inspector General of the Air Force. He also has been nominated for promotion to lieutenant general.

Brig. Gen. John H. Johns, director of the Human Resources Development Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, U.S. Army, has been selected Special Assistant for Drug Abuse to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.

Brig. Gen. Emmett H. Walker Jr., Army National Guard deputy director will become director, succeeding Maj. Gen. Charles A. Ott Jr., who completes his term of appointment in August 1978. Gen. Walker also has been nominated for promotion to major general.

Maj. Gen. Thomas E. Clifford, commander of the 26th North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) Region and the 26th Air Division, Luke AFB, Ariz., is the new deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. He assumed his new duties Sept. 1, succeeding Maj. Gen. Guy E. Hairston Jr., who was retired from the Air Force Aug. 1.

VAdm. Gravely

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